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RECENT DECISIONS
gence is of such outrageous character as to completely outweigh all the
charges against the other. A good example within this class of cases is
Hustad v. Evetts, 230 Wis. 292, 282 N. W. 595, (1939). In this case,
the plaintiff was an experienced milk man. He stepped from his wagon
without looking for traffic and was found negligent in this respect. The
defendant whose automobile struck the plaintiff as he did so step off his
wagon was found negligent as to speed, lookout and management. The
court held that the plaintiff's negligence, by its very character, was as a
matter of law greater than that of the defendant. The following cases
are similar in effect: Wedecky v. Grimes 229 Wis. 448, 282 N. W. 593,
(1938) ; Noyes v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 237 Wis. 141, 294 N. W.
63, (1941).
Lastly there are a few cases which stand as individual holdings and
do not, from the point of their outcome, fall into any of the groups of
cases indicated herein. In Patterson v. Chicago, St. Pa., Milwaukee &
0. R. Co. 236 Wis. 205, 294 N. W. 63, (1940), the plaintiff was at a
place to board the defendant's train. In order to do so he had to cross
certain tracks. He was struk and injured. Plaintiff was found negli-
gent with respect to lookout. The defendant was found negligent in fail-
ing to keep a proper guard for the protection of the defendant. The
court held that the negligence of the plaintiff was as a matter of law
equal to that of the defendant. There was a strong dissent by three
judges in this case. A like decision with a dissent is Hoskins v. Thenell,
232 Wis. 97, 286 N. W. 555, (1939).
ANTHONY J. PALAsz.
Federal Jurisdiction-Common Law Crimes Against the United
States.-In United States v. Jerome, 87 L. Ed. 433 (1943),--U.S.-,
S. Ct. -, the defendant was charged with violating section 2(a) of the
bank robbery act (May 18, 1934) 48 Stat. 783 c. 304 (August 24, 1937)
50 stat. 749, c. 747, 12 U.S.C.A. 588b which provides in part that "who-
ever shall enter or attempt to enter any bank or any building used in
whole or in part as a bank with intent to ocmmit in such bank or building
or part thereof, so used, any felony or larceny shall be fined not more
than $5,000.00 or imprisoned for more than tw.enty years or both." The
defendant was an army officer who while attempting to borrow money
from a National Bank was informed that he would be required to obtain
the signature of an officer of at least equal rank as surety upon his note.
The defendant forged the signature of an officer of superior rank. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals and quashed the indictment on the grounds
that the crime of forgery, although a felony under the laws of Vermont,
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was not a felony within the meaning of the statute, it not being a felony
under the statutes of the United States. The Court said, "We must gen-
erally assume, in absence of plain indication to the contrary, that con-
gress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the Fed-
eral act dependant on the state law. That assumption is based on the
fact that Federal legislation is nationwide,and at times on the fact that
the Federal program would be impaired if the state law were to control."
The court indicated that caution should be exercised in extending the
provision of a Federal statute to state crimes because the double jeop-
ardy provision of the Fifth Amendment does not stand as a 'bar to Fed-
eral prosecution though a state conviction on the same cast has already
been obtained.
The United States Supreme Court has therefore affirmatively de-
cided in favor of a second punishment where an act is both a crime
against the state and against the United States. Said Chief Justice Taft
in United States v. Lenza, 260 U. S. 377, 382; 43 S. Ct. 141, 142; 67 L.
Ed. 314: "We have here two sovereignties deriving power from differ-
ent sources, capable of dealing with the same subject under the same
territory. Each may without interference from the other enact laws to
secure prohibition with the limitation that no legislation can give validity
to act prohibitive by the same amendment. Each Government in deter-
mining what shall be an offense against its dignity and peace is exercis-
ing its own sovereignty, not that of the other. It follows that an act de-
nounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense
against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each."
It has been consistently held that there are no common law crimes
against the United States. All Federal crimes must be specifically pro-
vided for by statute. While there are no common law offenses against
the United States resort may be had to the common law for the defini-
tion of terms by which offenses are designated by statute, Pettibone v.
United States (1893) 148 U. S. 197; 13 S. Ct. 542; 37 L. Ed. 419.
The regulations issued by the several Governmental departments and
administrative agencies cannot make acts criminal which congress has
not made criminal. In United States v. George (1913) 228 U. S. 14; 33
S. Ct. 412; 57 L. Ed. 712, the defendant was indicted for perjury,
charging him with falsely and corruptly taking his solemn oath in a pro-
ceeding wherein a law of the United States authorized an oath to be
administered before the register of the United States land office. The
particular statute under which the defendant was charged provided that
"If ... the person making such entry.., proves by two credible wit-
nesses that he, she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same for
a period of five years ... and makes affidavit that no part of such land
had been alienated... and that he, she, or they will bear true allegiance
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to the Government of the United States, then in such case he, she, or
they... shall be entitled to a patent. The Secretary of the Interior in
this instance required the applicant to take such oath himself wherein it
will be noted the statute merely required proof by two credible wit-
nesses. The defendant falsely swore that he had made certain improve-
ments on the land. The defendant demurred to the charge alleging that
where the charge is of crime it must have clear legislative basis. The
court held that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to demand
such oath where it was not required by statute. The court said "It is
manifest that the regulation adds a requirement which that section does
not require and is not justified."
In United States v. Eaton (1892) 144 U. S. 677; 12 S. Ct. 764; 36
L. Ed. 591, the defendant, a wholesaler, was indicted for failure to keep
books showing receipts and sales for oleomargarine. The statute pro-
vided that all manufacturers were required to keep such records, but
contained no such provisions for a wholesaler. The court ruled that "the
Secretary of the Treasury cannot Alter or amend a revenue law to regu-
late the mode of providing to carry into effect what congress has
enacted."
Although the principle that there is no common law of the United
States has long been recognized in the field of Federal criminal law it
has only recently been recognized in Federal civil law. Plaintiff in Erie
Railway Company v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 364; 58 S. Ct. 17; 82 L. Ed.
1189 (1937), was injured while walking along defendant's right of way
by a boxcar door that was negligently left open, said injury occurring in
the state of Pennsylvania. The action was brought in the federal district
court in New York. Under the laws of Pennsylvania plaintiff was a
trespasser and defendant owed plaintiff no duty except not to wilfully
injure him. The lower court gave judgment to the plaintiff holding that
under the common law of the United.States it was the duty of defendant
railway not to negligently injure plaintiff. Reversing the judgment the
Supreme Court of the United States said, "Except in matters governed
by the Federal constitution or by acts of congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state
shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in
a decision is not a matter of Federal concern. There is not Federal gen-
eral common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature
or 'general,' be they commercial law or part of the law of torts. And no
clause in the constitution purports to confer such power on the Federal
Courts."
JORN L. GRAY
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